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C. Beckton*

R. v. O'Brien - Declarations
Against Penal Interest as an
Exception to the Hearsay
Rule

The development of the law of Evidence has evolved primarily by
judicial decision into a system which cannot be rationally put
together in a logical whole. The rules developed in myriads of cases
which later judges believed bound them by virtue of the doctrine of
stare decisis, and which also demanded that they avoid the
absurdities or injustices which the simple application of these rules
would produce. In their efforts to avoid this problem, judges have
created refinements and exceptions to the earlier rules. In recent
times the courts have even occasionally departed from previous
decisions with a clear statement to this effect. Despite these
innovative departures, the court can only apply a bandage to a
system which needs a major operation.'
The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. O'Brien2 has applied a
bandage to one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The hearsay
rule excludes evidence of statements made out of court when they
are tendered for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matter
stated. Ostensibly this evidence is excluded because of the lack of
safeguards such as cross-examination and oath which are felt enable
the court to better evaluate the veracity and accuracy of the
statement. Pursuant to the haphazard development mentioned
above, and premised upon the notion of circumstancial guaranties of
trustworthiness, a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule were
created. 3 One of these exceptions was that a declaration made by a
person, now deceased, which was against his pecuniary or
proprietary interest would be admissible. 4 This rule seems to be
premised upon the assumption that anyone who asserts a fact which
*Assistant Professor of Law, Dalhousie University
1. This is clearly expressed by Lord Reid in Myers v. D.P.P. (1964), 2 All E.R.
881 at 886:
...The only satisfactory solution is by legislation following on a wide survey
of the whole field and I think that such a survey is overdue. A policy of make do
and mend is no longer adequate.
2. (1977), 16N.R. 270(S.C.C.).
3. V. Wigmore, Evidence § 1455.
4. The Sussex Peerage, [1844] 8 E.R. 1034.
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is clearly against his or her own interest in unlikely to be incorrect or
insincere because he may be subjecting himself to civil liability.
Wigmore would add to this the criteria of necessity because the
declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable and there is often a dearth
5
of other evidence.
In the mid-nineteenth century the English House of Lords made it
clear that this exception did not apply to a declaration against penal
interest. 6 Sussex Peerage was followed extensively throughout
Canada and the United States until recent years. On June 24, 1977
the Supreme Court of Canada announced a departure from Sussex
Peerage stating that declarations against penal interest may now be
admissible. 7 Martin O'Brien and Paul Jensen had been jointly
charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of
trafficking. 8 Jensen fled, but O'Brien was arrested and subsequently
convicted of the offence. 9 After O'Brien's conviction, Jensen
returned and told O'Brien's counsel that he had committed the
crime alone and was willing to testify to this effect. '0 Unfortunately
for O'Brien, Jensen died before a re-hearing could be held.
O'Brien's counsel obtained a leave to adduce fresh evidence and he
repeated the statement given by Jensen before the British Columbia
Court of Appeal."- The court was persuaded by this evidence and
allowed the appeal and directed an acquittal. A leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada was granted on the question:
[Whether] the Court of Appeal for British Columbia erred at law
in holding that hearsay evidence given before that Court by
Sidney B. Simons pursuant to leave granted in accordance with
section 610 of the Criminal Code would have been capable of
raising a reasonable 12doubt in the mind of the trial judge as to the
guilt of the accused.
The full Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal
upon the basis that the statements made by Jensen failed to fall
within the exception, but stated that they would now depart from
Sussex Peerage and include declarations against penal interest in the
exception if they satisfied the criteria. 13
5. Supra, note 3 at § 1457.
6. Supra, note 4.

7. R. v. O'Brien, supra, note 2.
8. id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id.at 274.
13. Id.
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The Authorities Priorto O'Brien
Wigmore maintains that early English law did not distinguish
between the admissibility of declarations against proprietary,
pecuniary or penal interest. 14 The basic exception developed as a
matter of practice following the evolution of the hearsay rule. 15 The
early courts would admit account entries of a deceased person where
he had acknowledged receipt of money. 16 Admissions by a party in
action were also developing as an exception to the hearsay rule. In
the early 1800's there is some evidence that a unity of principle
treating all statements of this nature as exceptions to the hearsay rule
was argued for on the basis that all such statements concerned
matters which were prejudicial to the declarant's own interest thus
giving them circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 17
This unity, if it ever existed, was abruptly terminated in 1844 by
the decision of the House of Lords in Sussex Peerage.'8 The
plaintiff's claim was for a peerage and the resolution depended upon
whether the deceased peer, father of the claimant, had been
married. The Royal Marriage Act prohibited the contracting of
marriages or annulment of any already contracted in violation of its
provisions, whether the marriage was contracted or solemnised
within or outside of England. 19 A now deceased clergyman had told
his son that he had celebrated a marriage between the deceased peer
and his alleged wife contrary to the provisions of the Royal
Marriage Act, which could have subjected him to a criminal
prosecution. The Court, however, refused to admit this declaration
because the interest was not of a pecuniary nature, stating that the
law does not recognize the apprehension of possible danger of a
prosecution as creating an interest which is recognized for the
purpose of admissibility. 20 In dismissing the argument for
admissibility of this statement, the Court stated what they perceived
to be the dangers inherent in such an approach:
To say if a man should confess a felony for which he would be
liable to prosecution, that therefore, (the instant the grave closes
over him) all that was said by him is to be taken as evidence in
14. Supra, note 3 at § 1476.

15. Id.
16. Hinghain v. Ridgway (1908), 103 E.R. 717 (K.B.), although a later decision

relied on the earlier cases to this effect.
17. Supra, note 14.
18. Supra, note 4.
19. 12Geo. 3,c. 11.
20. Supra, note 4.
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every action and prosecution against another person, is one of the
and untenable propositions that can be
most monstrous
2
advanced. '
The case not only appeared to be badly argued, but it was also an
unfortunate case to use as a precedent because the statement was
made to a son where the apprehension of criminal prosecution
would be minimal. In the final analysis, the court failed to articulate
any rational policy for distinguishing between penal and pecuniary
interest and merely stated the rule as:
., . the only declaration of deceased persons receivable in
evidence, are those made against the proprietary or pecuniary
interests of the party making them when the subject matter of
is within the peculiar knowledge of the party so
such declarations
22
making them.
This pronouncement by the House of Lords was adhered to, at
least in theory, by both Canadian and American courts in the
century to follow. The oft-cited United States Supreme Court
decision which adopted Sussex Peerage was Donnelly v. U.S.2 3
Donnelly was convicted in the circuit court of the U.S. for the
Northern District of California upon an indictment for murder of
Chickasaw, an Indian of the Hoopa Valley Reservation. The
appellant's lawyer sought to introduce the confession of Joe Dick,.
now deceased, and circumstantial evidence which connected him to
the crime. In refusing to admit this confession, the majority cited
with approval Sussex Peerage and other U.S. decisions where
declarations against penal interest had been excluded and concluded
with the adopted admonition:
The danger of admitting hearsay evidence is sufficient to
admonish courts of justice against lightly yielding to introduction
of fresh exceptions to an old and well-established rule; the value
of which is felt and acknowledged by all. If the circumstance that
the eye witnesses of any fact be dead should justify the
introduction of testimony to establish that fact from hearsay, no
man could feel safe in any property, 2a4 claim to which might be
supported by proof so easily obtained.
Mr. Justice Holmes, supported by two other Justices, boldly
refused to follow the English position and in dissent argued for a
more liberal approach by the Supreme Court:
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1045.
Id.
[1913]228 U.S. 243.
Id. at 277.
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The rules of Evidence in the main are based on experience, logic
and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of
the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the
admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the
separation of the two countries do not bind us, the exception to
the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well
known; no other statement is as much against interest as a
confession of murder, it is far more calculated to convince
than
25
dying declarations which would be let in to hang a man.
In seriously questioning the philosophical rationale for excluding
declarations against penal interest, Justice Holmes seems to accept
Wigmore's exhortion that it is time to "discard this barbarous
doctrine" which seems calculated to create more injustices than it
would otherwise warrant. 26 The majority made no real effort to
examine the basis for the exclusion but merely accepted the doctrine
as articulated by these early decisions.
Although the Supreme Court had spoken on this issue, some
courts in the United States subsequently questioned or refused to
follow the decision. In 1946, the California Supreme Court in
People v. Spriggs,2 7 following the principle that courts must
develop judicially the law of evidence where the legislature is silent,
held that declarations against penal interest were admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Justice Traynor for the court, stated
that admissibility must be determined according to the principle
that,
[Tlhe purpose of all rules of evidence is to aid in arriving at the
truth, land] if it shall appear that any rule tends rather to hinder
than to facilitate, this result it should be abrogated without
hesitation.28
Following this, the court concluded that a declaration against penal
interest was as trustworthy as one against pecuniary interest and
furthermore the traditional concept of "pecuniary" interest could
logically include one's penal interest. In New York v. Brown 29 the
court expressed the opinion that:
The rule in New York should be modernized to hold that an
admission against penal interest will be received where material
and where the person making the admission is dead .... 30
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at277-278.
V. Wigmore, Evidence § 1477.
[1946] 60 C. 2d 868 (Calif.).
Id. at 845.
[1969] 26 N.Y.R. 2d 88 (N.Y.).
Id. at 94.
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The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Harris31 refused to extend this rule to
warrant proceedings and pointed out the doubts that had arisen
concerning the wisdom of the exclusion.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Chambers v. Missippi3 2 held
that the exclusion of testimony which indicated someone other than
the accused was the murderer was a breach of the defendant's right
to due process. Although the court did not specifically state
declarations against penal interest would be admissible in the future,
they did indicate that the evidence here was surrounded with
considerable assurances of reliability and for further support they
referred to the New Federal Rules of Evidence which would allow
such admissions in Federal Courts. 3 3 (Here the decision had
originated in a state court so the Federal Rules were not applicable.)
It seems from this decision that the American judiciary are moving
closer to what the drafters of the various Evidence rules have been
advocating for some time.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, were
approved in 1953 by the Conference and the American Bar
Association. 34 In these rules the drafters went beyond Justice
Traynor's approach in Spriggs and adopted Wigmore's analysis that
declarations against interest should not only be expanded to include
penal interest but also statements which subject the individual to a
risk of becoming an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval
since these probably mean as much to an individual as concern for
his pecuniary interest. 3 5 These rules, although adopted by some
states, extended the exception beyond what was entirely acceptable
by the majority of lawyers in the United States. 36
When the Federal Rules were initially drafted, a similar provision
was placed in as an exception to the hearsay rule where the declarant
was unavailableA 7 In the journey through Congress, the provisions
31. [19711403U.S. 573.
32. [19731410U.S. 284.
33. Id.
34. These rules were designed with the hope that all the American states would
adopt them, thus providing a uniform system of evidence among the states.
35. Unform Rule 62(10).
36. The California Evidence Code, approved May 18, 1965, effective January 1,
1967, adopted this rule as part of the provisions concerning exceptions to the
hearsay rule-Rule § 1230.
37. The Federal Rules of Evidence For United States Courts and Magistrates were
approved January 2, 1975 and came into effect July 1, 1975. These rules were the

R.v. O'Brien 819

relating to public ridicule, hatred or social disapproval were
abandoned. The advisory committee report gives as reasons for
deletion of this category that they lacked sufficient guarantees of
reliability. 3 8 Although they were willing to expand the exception to
include a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused, they placed a
limitation upon this, which reflected previously expressed concerns
with fabrication, requiring "corroborating circumstances clearly
indicating the trustworthiness of the statement before it could be
admitted". 39 When the Federal Rules were adopted in 1975, the
American Federal Court system began using a rule which reflects
Justice Holme's arguments in Donnelly that there is no logical
reason for differentiating between penal and pecuniary interest; in
fact, penal interest likely exercises a stronger claim as an exception
because of the potentially serious consequences attached to such a
statement. The additional requirement of corroborating circumstances will require some clarification but it should alleviate
concerns about fabrication.
CanadianExperience
In Canada, courts tended to follow Sussex Peerage, but in recent
years, as in the United States, some doubts began to appear in the
judgments as to the wisdom of the distinction made in Sussex
Peerage. In Regina v. Agawa and Mallet,40 Martin J. A. cites
criticisms of the rule but avoids a departure from it by suggesting
that even if this exception extended to declarations against penal
interest, the particular statement there likely would not fall within
the exception, nor was the declarant dead - he had merely refused
to testify. At present, Canadian Law only recognizes death as
sufficient to fulfill the requirement of unavailability.
In 1977 the Supreme Court of Canada was presented with an
opportunity to re-examine the admissibility of declarations against
penal interest when Peter Demeter appealed against his conviction
of murder in the death of his wife. 4 1 The Ontario Court of Appeal
joint product of the rule making process as evolved by the Supreme Court and the
legislative process as conducted by the two houses of the Congress.
38. Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 804(3). The Advisory Committee was
appointed in March, 1965, by Chief Justice Earl Warren to formulate rules of
evidence for the federal courts.
39. Supra, note 37, Rule 804(3).
40. (1975), 31 C.R.N.S. 293 (Ont. C.A.).
41. R. v. Demeter (1977), 15 N.R. 46 (S.C.C.).
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had stated that it was not bound by Sussex Peerage but declined to
settle the law because it felt the facts of this case did not warrant
such an examination. 4 2 This did not, however, prevent the court
from enunciating a number of criteria which would have to be met
in addition to those applicable in deciding whether a declaration is
against proprietary or pecuniary interest. 4 3 The Supreme Court
referred to these as "a valuable guide for consideration" in the
aa
event that it should decide to depart from Sussex Peerage.
Without making this decision, the Supreme Court determined that
the declarations in question would not even meet the initial
requirements. The inference was strong, however, that given a
suitable opportunity, the court would choose to depart from Sussex
Peerage.
The court was, within a matter of months, challenged with this
question in R. v. O'Brien,45 where it stated that it would now be
prepared to depart from Sussex Peerage and admit declarations
against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. Mr.
Justice Dickson, speaking for the court, attacked Sussex Peerage by
an examination of the rationale underlying the rule and concluded
that the court could find no reason to distinguish between
declarations against penal and pecuniary interest. 4 6 This conclusion
was based upon the assumption that an individual would be as likely
to speak the truth when a matter affected his liberty as when it
concerned his pecuniary interest. The court also expressed the
concern that such an absolute rule forbidding admission could create
situations where a grave injustice may be perpetrated. 4 7 It seems
that any concern about fabrication would be alleviated by reference
to the criteria required for admissibility of a declaration. The criteria
used by the court were those enunciated by the Ontario Court of
Appeal and approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Demeter.4 8 In view of the approach adopted by the court, these
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Supra, note 2
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In Demeter, supra, note 41, the Supreme Court set out the additional criteria as
enunciated by the Ontario Court of Appeal. These were in essence:
1. The declaration would have to made to such a person and in such circumstances
that the declarant should have apprehended a vulnerability to penal consequences as
a result.
2. The vulnerability to penal consequences would have to be not remote.
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criteria will likely be applied fairly stringently and it will be a rare
case where a declaration exculpating an accused will be admissible
under this exception.
What has this decision accomplished? It has removed the
distinction between penal and pecuniary interest which had existed
ostensibly because of a fear of fabrication. Although this fear may
have some foundation, it is not sufficient to require absolute
exclusion, particularly where criteria can be established which
would protect against misleading or fabricated statements. The
judge or jury should be in a position to assess the weight of any
statement, and suspicion of fabrication would merely reduce the
weight to be attached to it.
This case also reinforces the attitude of the court reflected in other
evidence decisions such as Ares v. Venner, 49 where a willingness
was expressed to amend another area of evidence law without
stipulating, as Lord Reid had, that this was a proper matter for the
legislature. The court was responsive in both O'Brien and Ares to a
felt need for change - in one to rectify an arbitrary distinction, 50
and in the other to modernize an exception to reflect the realities of
modem business practices. 5 1 In this instance, the court was
influenced by the controversy and clamour in the United States for a
recognition of the absurdity of the existing distinction. 52 Although
the court did not refer specifically to the New Federal Rules
(perhaps because it felt this was legislative action whereas the
court's change had to be compatible with existing judicial
principles) it seems to halre followed the general principles
articulated in the rules. While the Supreme Court does not mention
3. The declaration sought to be given in evidence must be considered in its totality.
If upon the whole tenor the weight is in favour of the declarant it is not against his
interest.
4. In a doubtful case a court may properly consider whether or not there are other
circumstances connecting the declarant with the crime and whether or not there is
any connection between the declarant and the accused.
5. The declarant would have to be unavailable by reason of death, insanity, grave
illness which prevents the giving of testimony even from a bed, or absence in a
jurisdiction to which none of the processes of the Court extends.
It is unlikely the Supreme Court would wholly adopt this last criteria as later
comments indicate unavailability would still be limited to the situation where the
declarant is dead. This last criteria is fairly widely accepted by the U.S. courts.
49. (1970), S.C.R. 608; (1969, 70 W.W.R. 96).
50. R. v. O'Brien, supra, note 2.
51. Ares v. Venner, supra, note 49.
52. Supra, note 50.
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corroborating circumstances, the criteria that it would use reflects
the same concern and may achieve the same result. These criteria
likely give the judge more guidance whereas the Federal Rules leave
it to judicial discretion as to what will constitute corroborating
circumstances.
Although one may laud the court for taking a progressive step
forward instead of shifting the burden to the legislature, all that has
been created is another refinement to an already overly-burdened
haphazard system, and it does little to rationalize the system of
evidence. Courts must, of necessity, in individual decisions have a
narrow focus and must decide the case on principles pertinent to the
particular factual situation presented. This does not permit the
courts to revitalize the law of evidence and prevent it from further
approaching the complexity of the Maze of the Minotaur.
It appears that Lord Reid is correct when he insists that it is the
legislature's responsibility to undertake a major operation on the
rules of evidence. The courts cannot be given this power - nor
should they since this is not a judicial but rather a legislative
function. Rather, the legislators must be in their wisdom provide an
orderly framework for the judges to operate in. It is their role to take
the centuries of haphazard development and reshape and mould
them into a workable, efficient system designed to meet the needs of
today's society.
In Canada the demand for a reform of the evidence law has been
much slower than in the United States. It was not until 1975 that the
Law Reform Commission of Canada published a proposed Code of
Evidence, whereas the Americans have been proposing changes
since the 1940's. 53 The resistance to the proposed code has been
strenuous for many reasons - one being a simple fear of change. In
the proposed Code the problems pertaining to declarations against
interest would be partially eliminated by subsuming it under the
general exception for statements admissible if the declarant is
unavailable, and the statement would be admissible if made by a
person while testifying as a witness. 5 4 This section is premised upon
the assumption that if a person is unavailable, statements made by
that individual may provide the best evidence. 55 Admissibility
53. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, Ottawa,
Information Canada, 1975.

54. Id. section 29. Section 29 is an exception to the basic prohibition against
hearsay articulated in Section 27.
55. Id., comments pp. 70-71.
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becomes the rule and probative value is then assessed by the judge
or jury. Although not specifically articulated, it is likely that matters
such as a lack of corroborating circumstances or danger of
fabrication would be signs or indicators of the weight to be attached
to the evidence instead of the criteria for determining admissibility.
One of the advantages of this rule would be to dispense with the fine
distinctions that have been made at common law. It is, however,
highly unlikely that it would make a substantive difference because
the judges are likely to look for similar criteria before finding that a
statement is relevant. If this is to be the situation, it may be more
advisable to articulate the key exceptions such as declarations
against interest in the manner in which the Federal Rules enunciate
them. 5 6 This narrows the extent of admissibility and provides more
guidelines for judges and litigants to operate within, thus creating
more certainty.
No matter what the ultimate resolution of the problem, it is
apparent that an entire change is required to rationalize the system
of evidence law and declarations against interest will be one of the
integral parts which combine to create the system. For the present,
the Supreme Court has clarified the situation and pointed the trend
for the reformers or at least adopted the trend of earlier reformers.
56. Supra, note 39.

